5
expenses is a primary raison d'�tre for the deduction under
section 162(a)(2). Barone v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 462, 465-466
(1985), affd. without published opinion 807 F.2d 177 (9th Cir.
1986). While the meaning of the phrase "substantial, continuous,
and duplicative" may lie to some extent in the eyes of the
beholder, we concluded in Barone v. Commissioner, supra at 466,
that:
Petitioner's total payment to his parents for the use of
* * * their house amounts to $503 for the taxable year 1981.
This token amount together with payments he made for his
share of the electric and telephone bills does not
constitute substantial, continuing living expenses. [Fn.
ref. omitted; citation omitted.]
The facts of this case are similar to the facts in Barone.
Petitioner argues that our decisions in Gustafson v.
Commissioner, 3 T.C. 998 (1944), and Ralston v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1968-248, are controlling. We disagree. While the
facts of Gustafson are somewhat similar, the reasoning of that
opinion is no longer apposite. We noted in Hicks v.
Commissioner, supra at 74, "a change in the judicial climate * *
* has sapped the Gustafson opinion of much, if not all, of its
vitality."
In Ralston the taxpayer incurred only minimal expenses, but
there was a coalescence of other factors that suggested a
different result. The taxpayer claimed that Louisville,
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