6
Kentucky, was his tax home. He was a groom for a racing stable
located in Louisville, but spent much of the year at various
racetracks around the country. Part of that time, however, was
spent at Keeneland Race Track in Lexington, Kentucky, near
Louisville, and, when he was not on the racing circuit, the
taxpayer was working at the home stable in Louisville. We
concluded that:
Where there has been a coalescence of place of abode
and the performance of some work in the vicinity thereof for
an employer who was based in the same vicinity, the courts
have generally permitted a deduction for meals and lodging
elsewhere. * * * [Ralston v. Commissioner, supra.]
Those factors are not present in this case.
In sum, we conclude that petitioner cannot claim that Boise,
Idaho, was his home for the purposes of section 162(a)(2).3
While he did spend his idle time there, the source of his
3 In James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir.
1962), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit indicated that,
while the existence of a tax home was a prerequisite to deducting
total (emphasis in the original) traveling expenses, an itinerant
taxpayer (without a tax home) might be able to deduct that
portion of his traveling expenses attributable to the increased
cost of meals and lodging associated with travel. Appeal in this
case lies in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
However, James was decided based on the language "the entire
amount" in section 23(a)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 and that language has been removed from the statute by a
1962 amendment. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. 87-834, sec. 4(b),
76 Stat. 960, 976-977. Furthermore, we need not decide whether
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would interpret the
amended statute as it did in James, because petitioner, as in
James, has not shown what portion of his traveling expenses are
attributable to the increased cost associated with travel.
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