Leo N. Levitt and Ruth G. Levitt - Page 44

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                    f.   No Special Circumstances                                     
               The final element of collateral estoppel is present because            
          petitioners do not contend nor do we find that there are special            
          circumstances present that would warrant not applying the normal            
          rules of preclusion.  Montana v. United States, supra; Meier v.             
          Commissioner, supra at 291-292.                                             
               3.   Lack of Mutuality                                                 
               Petitioners point out that there is no mutuality here                  
          because respondent would not be collaterally estopped from                  
          proceeding against petitioner even if respondent had lost the               
          bankruptcy case.  Petitioners contend that collateral estoppel              
          should not apply because there is no mutuality.  Gammill v.                 
          Commissioner, 62 T.C. at 614-615; Divine v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.           
          152, 156 (1972), affd. on this issue, revd. and remanded in part            
          500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974).  Under the doctrine of mutuality,             
          neither party may use a prior judgment to estop the other unless            
          the judgment binds both parties.  Meier v. Commissioner, supra at           
          283.                                                                        
               Other than arguing that mutuality would not apply because              
          the taxpayer here is not the same as that in In re Resyn Corp, 81           
          USTC par. 9808 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (which we discussed in                  
          section B-2-c, above), petitioners made no convincing argument              
          that mutuality would not apply here.  Further, mutuality is no              
          longer a requirement for applying collateral estoppel.  Parklane            
          Hosiery v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Meier v. Commissioner,               




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