Leo N. Levitt and Ruth G. Levitt - Page 45

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          supra at 283; 1B Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, par. 0.441 [3.-           
          2] at 527-535 (2d ed. 1985).  Thus, petitioner's reliance on                
          Gammill and Divine is misplaced.                                            
               4.   Conclusion--Collateral Estoppel Applies                           
               We conclude that petitioner is collaterally estopped from              
          contesting the factual findings of the bankruptcy court in In re            
          Resyn Corp., 81-2 USTC par. 9808 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981).                      
          Collateral estoppel establishes all of the facts found by the               
          bankruptcy court for purposes of the instant case.  However, our            
          findings of fact are also fully supported by the record in this             
          case.  The findings of fact by the bankruptcy court provide an              
          alternative basis for many of those facts.                                  
          C.   Whether Respondent's Determination Is Arbitrary                        
               Respondent's determination is generally presumed to be                 
          correct.  Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).                     
          Petitioners contend that respondent's determination is arbitrary            
          and should not be presumed to be correct because respondent had             
          no rational basis for determining that petitioner received                  
          constructive income from Chemical Traders and Polymer which he              
          diverted from Resyn.  We disagree.                                          
               A notice of deficiency that lacks a rational basis is                  
          arbitrary and not presumed to be correct.  Llorente v.                      
          Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1981), affg. in part and           
          revg. and remanding in part on this issue 74 T.C. 260 (1980).  To           
          show that the Commissioner acted rationally, the record must link           




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