- 25 -
undertake the kind of detailed analysis that would permit us to
determine whether Professor Rubinfeld's analysis supports the
opinion he expresses or rejects it. We have therefore not relied
upon his report in deciding this case.
Our review of the facts convinces us that on Sundays, and
occasionally on other days, petitioner could and did sell 4-day
bread at regular retail prices, and in sufficient quantities so as
to constitute meaningful sales. Congress, by enacting section
170(e)(3), intended to encourage donations of the type in question
for the direct use of a special and narrowly limited class of
recipients; namely, the ill, the needy, and infants. Section
170(e)(3)(A). As the Conference Committee Report quoted above
notes, before the addition of section 170(e)(3), contributions of
food, clothing, medical equipment, and supplies for the benefit of
such persons had dried up as a result of the limitations imposed by
section 170(e)(1). We think section 170(e)(3) and sections 1.170A-
1(c)(2) and (3), Income Tax Regs., should not be interpreted in such
a restrictive way as to unnecessarily inhibit donations of the type
Congress meant to encourage, and certainly petitioner's bread
donations are of that type.
Furthermore, we again note that Congress was careful to draft
section 170(e)(3)(B) in such a way as to prevent the situation where
a taxpayer would be better off, after tax, by donating the property
than it would have been if it had sold the donated property and
Page: Previous 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011