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conclude that only the second offer is subject to acceptance for
the Commissioner. Specifically, petitioners argue:
The word "offer" in the second * * * paragraph [of
the Form 870-L(AD)] refers to the last use of the word
"offer" in the first * * * paragraph, which is the
offer to waive the restrictions on assessment and
collection. Simply stated, this language meant that
the assessment and collection of the agreed to
liability could not take place until after the waiver
of those restrictions was accepted on behalf of the
Commissioner. * * * [Fn. ref. omitted.]
We find petitioners' interpretation unconvincing.
Petitioners argue that the term "undersigned", as used in
the Form 870-L(AD), is ambiguous because the Form 870-L(AD)
contained a signature line for both the taxpayer and respondent's
representative. On May 2, 1991, when Mrs. Ray executed the Form
870-L(AD) on behalf of RDB, her signature was the only signature
on the Form 870-L(AD), and she became the "undersigned". We
conclude that petitioners' arguments that the Form 870-L(AD) is
ambiguous are without merit.
Petitioners argue that the Palka and Balboni letters
constitute an offer, and signing the Form 870-L(AD) was the
specified method for accepting that offer. Respondent argues
that, by signing the Form 870-L(AD), petitioners extended an
offer of settlement, and respondent accepted petitioners' offer
on December 6, 1991. Respondent contends that the Balboni and
Palka letters solicited an offer from petitioners and set a
deadline for petitioners to submit the settlement agreement to
the appeals office. The parties do not dispute that an agreement
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