- 14 -
Rule 91(e) provides that "A stipulation and the admissions therein
shall be binding and have effect only in the pending case and not
for any other purpose, and cannot be used against any of the
parties thereto in any other case or proceeding."
While we may not take a stipulated fact in one case and use it
to find facts in another case, we think that we do have the ability
to prevent inconsistent results in the situation before us. We
have previously held that we may apply equitable principles to
decide a matter over which we have jurisdiction, Woods v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 787-788 (1989). Such equitable
principles include the doctrine of judicial estoppel, Reynolds v.
Commissioner, 861 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1988), revg. T.C. Memo.
1987-261; Huddleston v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 17, 28 (1993). The
doctrine of judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the
judicial process by preventing a party from successfully asserting
one position before a court and thereafter asserting a completely
contradictory position before the same or another court merely
because it is now in that party's interest to do so. Reynolds v.
Commissioner, supra at 472; Huddleston v. Commissioner, supra at
26. Such manipulation of the judicial process has been
characterized by the courts as "cynical gamesmanship * * * to suit
7(...continued)
Cir. 1987); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.
1980); St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC, 605 F.2d 1169,
1172 (10th Cir. 1979). "Judicial notice is particularly
applicable to the court's own records of prior litigation closely
related to the case before it." St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc.
v. FDIC, supra at 1172.
Page: Previous 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011