- 16 - prevent us from applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Accordingly, we hold that respondent is judicially estopped from claiming that the payments to Mr. Maynard were not fees for his consulting services. It follows that petitioner is entitled to a deduction for the $52,999.50. Petitioner claimed a deduction in the amount of $256.16 for expenses incurred in moving Renata's possessions from New Mexico to California. Petitioner also claimed a deduction in the amount of $248 for an airline ticket to Albuquerque, New Mexico, so that she could assist in moving Renata and Renata's daughter. In addition, petitioner claimed a deduction in the amount of $48.83 for a room at the Geronimo Motel in Flagstaff, Arizona, where the three of them stayed on their way to California. Renata had wanted to return to California, but had no money. Petitioner wanted Renata to work for her, and after moving to California in 1989, Renata went to work for petitioner's business as a translator and a job developer. In general, where an expenditure is primarily associated with business purposes, and personal benefit is distinctly secondary and incidental, the expenditure may be deducted under section 162. International Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 94, 104 (1970); Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 463, 467-468 (1955). Conversely, if an expenditure is primarily motivated by personal considerations, no deduction will be allowed. Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961); Larrabee v.Page: Previous 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011