3
was ordered to be filed as an amended petition on February 10,
1994.
Said paragraph 2 contained allegations by petitioners as to
their gross receipts, gross income, adjustments to income,
deductions, exemptions, and net taxable income for 1990 and 1991,
respectively.
Respondent filed an answer denying all material parts of the
amended petition, and the case was at issue on April 11, 1994.
Thereafter, on September 6, 1994, petitioners filed a motion
for summary judgment in which petitioners repeated again the tax
protester rhetoric that had been struck from the first petition,
e.g., (a) that respondent's statutory notice was defective as a
matter of law; (b) that respondent had no jurisdiction to
determine deficiencies against petitioners; and (c) whether
respondent could convert "a voluntary noncompulsory tax system as
enacted by Congress" into a "nonvoluntary compulsory tax system".
The Court answered the contentions of petitioners in an
order dated September 14, 1994, in which, after summarizing
petitioners' contentions, the Court denied the motion for summary
judgment by petitioners, and quoted Lonsdale v. Commissioner, 661
F.2d 71, 72 (5th Cir. 1981), affg. T.C. Memo. 1981-122, which
said:
Appellant's contentions are stale ones, long
settled against them. As such, they are frivolous.
Bending over backwards, in indulgence of appellant's
pro se status, we today forbear the sanctions of * * *
[damages for frivolous appeals]. We publish this
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