United Circuits, Inc. - Page 6

                                        - 6 -                                         
          acquired as described above was substantially greater than the              
          duration of the purported leases.                                           
               Northcutt's clerk prepared UCI's 1989 and 1990 tax returns             
          based on the ledgers and invoices provided by UCI.  Northcutt did           
          not review the purported lease transactions that were entered               
          into by UCI.  Neither Northcutt nor her clerk verified the lease            
          expenses as part of UCI's return preparation.  Petitioner                   
          deducted the payments for the asset acquisitions as "Lease                  
          Expense" on its 1989 and 1990 tax returns in the aggregate                  
          amounts of $141,105 and $56,925, respectively.  Northcutt                   
          reviewed and checked the returns before sending them to UCI for             
          signature.  Jump and Schubert each spent 5 to 10 minutes                    
          reviewing the Federal income tax returns after they were received           
          from Northcutt.  Schubert, as president of UCI, signed the                  
          returns in both 1989 and 1990.                                              
                                       OPINION                                        
               Respondent determined that the lease expenses claimed by               
          petitioner were capital expenses and disallowed the deductions.             
          Petitioner has conceded the $68,587 and $33,638 deficiencies for            
          1989 and 1990, respectively.  Petitioner argues, however, that it           
          is not liable for the accuracy related penalties because there              
          was substantial authority for its position on its tax returns and           
          because petitioner's reliance on its accountant was reasonable              
          and in good faith.  Respondent contends that there is no                    
          substantial authority for petitioner's position on its tax                  




Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011