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ownership from the condemnation award. Furthermore, we are
satisfied that petitioner's lifestyle did not change on account
of her husband's receipt of the condemnation award. Although
petitioner may have received some benefit from the 1986
condemnation award, we believe that such a benefit did not exceed
her normal level of support, which is not a significant benefit.
Flynn v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 355, 367 (1989).
We conclude that petitioner did not derive a significant
benefit from Mr. Acquaviva's omission of the 1986 condemnation
award. Accordingly, under the facts and circumstances of this
case, we find that it would be inequitable to hold petitioner
liable for that portion of the deficiencies in tax arising from
Mr. Acquaviva's understatement of income attributable to the 1986
condemnation award.
The same cannot be said of the 1986 constructive dividends.
Here the evidence demonstrates that petitioner benefited from the
constructive dividends paid to Mr. Acquaviva. During 1986,
Magnum paid $23,890 for the installation of a swimming pool at
the Acquavivas' home and $20,000 for home improvements.
Petitioner's lifestyle was enhanced by these home improvements.
We find that the 1986 constructive dividend was used to benefit
petitioner beyond normal support. We hold that it is not
inequitable to hold petitioner liable for the portion of the
deficiency attributable to the 1986 constructive dividends; thus,
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