Theodore A. Andros and Joan B. Andros - Page 48

                                        -48-                                          
         did he otherwise discuss with them the prices they were getting for          
         the spreads.                                                                 
              Moreover, even though in 1979 options traders generally relied          
         upon the Black-Scholes theoretical pricing model, Mr. Illingworth            
         was unaware of the model.  Even in the absence of Mr. Illingworth’s          
         usage of the Black-Scholes theoretical pricing model, Mr.                    
         Illingworth should have known that Tandrill was systematically               
         receiving far less than fair value for the spreads it was selling.38         
         Such transactions result from a systematic disregard of economic             
         values in executing option spread transactions.39                            

               38   For example, when Tandrill closed out its credit                  
          spreads, in each case it paid more for the closing spread than              
          its maximum theoretical value.                                              
               39   Respondent claims that Fox v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.               
          1001 (1984), is factually similar to this case.  Respondent                 
          posits that Tandrill’s option spreads were similar to the 1977              
          series of transactions in Fox in that both were initiated and               
          closed out in the same year and over a relatively short period of           
          time.                                                                       
                    In Fox all the transactions were executed through                 
          Arbitrage Management.  Like Tandrill’s two option spread                    
          transactions executed through Arbitrage Management (but unlike              
          the six such transactions executed through Pershing), the spreads           
          in Fox were debit and bearish spreads.  Id. at 1003.  Also, the             
          taxpayers in Fox and Tandrill each sustained economic losses.               
          Id. at 1004.                                                                
                    Further, the tax strategy used by the taxpayer in Fox             
          was very similar to the strategy Tandrill followed.  The taxpayer           
          in Fox reported ordinary losses and short-term capital gains for            
          the years in issue, treating the dispositions of individual legs            
          of the spreads as separate taxable events.  Because Treasury                
          bills were at that time specifically excluded from the definition           
          of a capital asset by sec. 1221(5), the taxpayer reported the               
          losses as ordinary losses.  This Court upheld the deficiency,               
          holding that the taxpayer did not enter into the transactions               
                                                             (continued...)           





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