Barry B. Bealor and Nancy L. Bealor, et al. - Page 37

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          Indeed, Fred and Bruce promised them tax losses, but the only               
          loss they incurred was the economic loss of their cash payments,            
          which were absorbed by fees and other payments to BBPA and                  
          Machise.                                                                    
               Fred structured the employee leasing transactions so that              
          the lessor partnerships would be on the cash basis.  Under the              
          employee leasing agreements, the partnerships could not seek                
          income in the form of "rents" for their leased employees until              
          after the year in which the partnerships allegedly furnished and            
          paid those employees.  Thus the transactions were structured so             
          that the partnerships were guaranteed a loss, in every instance,            
          in the first year of operation.  Their partners used their pro              
          rata shares of that loss to reduce, or "shelter", unrelated                 
          taxable income.  This sheltering of income is the only                      
          justification for establishing a structure in which the investors           
          would automatically be deprived of any income in the first year             
          of operation.  As we have said:                                             
                    Petitioners argue that under the * * *                            
               transaction, there was a reasonable prospect for a                     
               profit.  This argument conveniently overlooks the fact                 
               that in the critical year--the loss year--there was no                 
               prospect for any profit, for any other result would                    
               have destroyed the raison d'etre for entering into the                 
               * * * transaction in the first place. * * *                            
          Glass v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1087, 1174 (1986), affd. sub nom.            
          Herrington v. Commissioner, 854 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1988), affd.             
          sub nom. Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1988),               
          affd. sub nom. Ratliff v. Commissioner, 865 F.2d 97 (6th Cir.               




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