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In recent years, New Jersey has noticeably liberalized its
law of psychological or moral duress. Warner-Lambert
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sylk, 471 F.2d 1137, 1143-1144 (3d Cir.
1972) (citing Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d 11, 14 (N.J.
1956)). However, even though New Jersey no longer requires that
duress produce fear sufficient to overcome the will of a person
of ordinary firmness, but only that the fear overcome the will of
the person threatened, it still requires that the threat be
wrongful. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sylk, 471 F.2d at
1144 (citing Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 120 A.2d at 14);
Continental Bank v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., 459 A.2d 1163,
1175 (N.J. 1983); New Jersey Hosp. Association v. Fishman, 661
A.2d 842, 848 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
Alice Berger asserts that the Chancery Court ordered her to
sign the 1988 return and that she signed it because she believed
she had no choice and was afraid of the "consequences" of defying
a court order. Although she signed the return at the courthouse,
she does not appear to have been signed it before a judge who was
threatening improper or oppressive "consequences". See In re
N.D.N.Y. Grand Jury Subpoena No. 86-0351-S, 811 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1987; In re Marriage of Betts, 558 N.E. 2d 404, 427, 430 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990). Alice Berger did not testify that the Chancery
Court had threatened "consequences" directly to her. Nor did she
testify to the consequences she believed she had been threatened
with.
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