- 25 -
In the absence of direct evidence, we could consider
credible, secondary evidence. Malinowski v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 1120, 1125 (1979). The only evidence offered by petitioners
to carry their burden is their own testimony. We found
Mr. Bowden’s testimony on this subject to be vague, conclusory,
uncorroborated, and in many respects, contradictory.13
Petitioners’ attorney, Mr. Handel, did not know who owned
the machines after the Prudential Bancorp transaction.14
Mr. Handel disclaimed any personal knowledge of the agreements or
their purported contents.
Petitioners also relied on a September 20, 1989, letter from
the law firm of Glass, Alper, Goldberg & Cohn, which contains a
statement that ownership of the vending machines will vest in
Mr. Handel’s client. This letter, by itself, is inconclusive
13 In an effort to establish their ownership of the
machines, petitioners attempted to introduce into evidence “re-
creations” of these purportedly lost documents. At trial, we
held that those documents were not admissible because they were
hearsay.
14 The following exchange between respondent’s counsel and
Mr. Handel is instructive:
Q: Okay. And are there any documents showing that the
ownership went to the * * * [petitioners] -- clearly
stating ownership went to the * * * [petitioners]?
A: No. I don’t think so. I think they only alluded
to. There is a release of the UCC interest in the
machines by MDFC.
Respondent followed the same line of questioning with various
financial institutions with consistent responses by Mr. Handel.
Page: Previous 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011