- 9 - the "nature" of a claim. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971). In a case such as this where the settlement lacks express language stating that the payment was made on account of personal injuries, the intent of the payor in making the payment is the most important factor to be discerned. Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1965), affg. T.C. Memo. 1964-33. This is a factual determination, and is made based upon an examination of all the evidence. Seay v. Commissioner, supra at 37. Petitioner argues that a host of tort claims were settled by his agreement with ABMI. Petitioner has not demonstrated, however, that Anacker, as representative of ABMI, the payor, was aware of such claims at the time the agreement was negotiated. See Galligan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-605. Based on the record, the most that can be said is that petitioner apprised Anacker of a potential action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in a claimed employment contract with ABMI. Even if we accept, arguendo, that petitioner's employment was not at-will,3 and that there was a breach of an implied covenant, the relief for such a breach is limited under California law to traditional contractual remedies.4 See Mundy 3California Labor Code sec. 2922 (West 1989) provides in relevant part, "An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other". 4We note that, even in the case of at-will employment, tort remedies are available to an employee if he or she is terminated in contravention of "public policy". E.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1331 (Cal. 1980) (Employer's (continued...)Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
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