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583, 587-589 (6th Cir. 1993), affg. T.C. Memo. 1992-610, and does
not confine it to cases of allocation of payments to covenants
not to compete, Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319, 321-322
(6th Cir. 1984). Although this Court generally applies the
"strong proof" rule originally enunciated in Ullman v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C. 129 (1957), affd. 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.
1959), we are bound to apply the Danielson rule if we are
satisfied that the Court of Appeals to which the case is
appealable would do so, Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970), affd. 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971); Lardas v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. 490 (1992); Lang v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-474.
In arguing that we should look beyond the express terms of
the purchase agreement, petitioners don't contend that the
agreement was entered into under any mistake, undue influence,
fraud, duress, or the like. Instead, petitioners dispute the
substance of the transaction, asserting that the purchase
agreement alone doesn't express the reality of the transaction as
actually consummated by the parties.
We're satisfied that the Danielson rule doesn't confine
petitioner's tax treatment to the terms of the purchase
agreement. We so hold because the purchase agreement alone
didn't reflect the entirety of the subsequently consummated
transaction that actually occurred. We have not only looked at
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