Hospital Corporation of America and Subsidiaries - Page 23

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                    When a court reviews an agency's construction of                  
               the statute which it administers, it is confronted with                
               two questions.  First, always, is the question whether                 
               Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at                
               issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the                
               end of the matter; for the court, as well as the                       
               agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed                
               intent of Congress.  If, however, the court determines                 
               Congress has not directly addressed the precise                        
               question at issue, the court does not simply impose its                
               own construction on the statute, as would be necessary                 
               in the absence of an administrative interpretation.                    
               Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with                     
               respect to the specific issue, the question for the                    
               court is whether the agency's answer is based on a                     
               permissible construction of the statute.  [Chevron                     
               U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467                   
               U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984); fn. refs. omitted.]                          
          See also NationsBank v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.            
          ___, 115 S. Ct. 810, 813 (1995); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.             
          LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647-648 (1990).  The Supreme Court                 
          further has stated that a reviewing court                                   
               need not conclude that the agency construction was the only            
               one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the                    
               construction, or even the reading the court would have                 
               reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial             
               proceeding.  [Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.                
               Council, Inc., supra at 843 n.11; citations omitted.]                  
               Accordingly, "If the administrator's reading fills a gap or            
          defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the                  
          legislature's revealed design, we give the administrator's                  
          judgment 'controlling weight.'"  NationsBank v. Variable Annuity            
          Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. at    , 115 S. Ct. at 813-814.  Despite             
          the fact that the Chevron rule "has had a checkered career in the           
          tax arena", Central Pa. Sav. Association v. Commissioner, 104               
          T.C. 384, 391-392 (1995), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth                




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