- 14 -
248 (1995). Ordinarily, the plain meaning of statutory language
is conclusive. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 241-242 (1989).
Where a statute is silent or ambiguous, however, we look to
legislative history in an effort to ascertain congressional
intent. Burlington No. R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Commn., 481 U.S.
454, 461 (1987); United States v. American Trucking Associations,
Inc., supra at 543-544; Peterson Marital Trust v. Commissioner,
102 T.C. 790, 799 (1994), affd. 78 F.3d 795 (2d Cir. 1996); U.S.
Padding Corp. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 177, 184 (1987), affd. 865
F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1989). Even where the statutory language
appears to be clear, we are not precluded from consulting
legislative history. United States v. American Trucking
Associations, Inc., supra at 543-544. Nevertheless, our
authority to construe a statute is limited where the agency
charged with administering that statute has promulgated
regulations thereunder.
The limitation on our authority is found in the so-called
Chevron rule as stated in the following passage:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of
the statute which it administers, it is confronted with
two questions. First, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
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