15
authority under various other sections of the fertilizer law in
an attempt to show a law enforcement purpose. However, the
payments at issue in this case stem from N.C. Gen. Stat. sec.
106-665 and Va. Code Ann. Sec. 3.1-106.13 (Michie 1994). We need
not, and do not, decide the purposes of any other sections of the
fertilizer laws.
Respondent argues that the legislature contemplated that a
separate civil action for damages would be the compensatory
remedy for the consumers of deleterious fertilizers. Respondent
reasons that since this compensatory remedy exists, the payments
at issue are not designed to compensate the consumer of the
deficient fertilizer. We do not agree. N.C. Gen. Stat. sec.
106-665 applies to the sales of large and small quantities of
fertilizer. The experts in this case testified that the reduced
crop yield from a deficient fertilizer is difficult to establish.
We consider it likely that this difficulty also would hamper a
plaintiff's ability to prove damages in a civil case. Thus, we
do not agree that a civil action for damages is "the primary
compensatory or remedial mechanism" in the fertilizer law. See
True v. United States, 894 F.2d 1197, 1205-1206 (10th Cir. 1990)
(stating that provision in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act authorizing Government to recoup oil cleanup costs was
primary compensatory mechanism). If the legislature considered a
civil action for damages to be the primary compensatory remedy,
then we would see no purpose for the legislative edict that the
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011