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acts. Mecom v. Commissioner, supra at 384-385. In signing a
written agreement, the parties manifest assent to its provisions.
Id. at 385. To construe the terms of the parties’ agreement,
therefore, we look to the language of the written agreement. Id.
at 384, 385; Kronish v. Commissioner, supra at 693.2 Only if a
written agreement is ambiguous do we look behind it to ascertain
the intentions of the parties. Rink v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.
319, 325 (1993), affd. 47 F.3d 168 (6th Cir. 1995). A written
agreement is ambiguous if it can reasonably be interpreted to
have more than one meaning. Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776,
780 (1989). If the written agreement is ambiguous, the finder of
fact may resort to extrinsic facts to interpret the parties'
intent in signing the agreement. Id.
With the foregoing in mind, we look to the words the parties
to the agreement used to memorialize their agreement. The
Joneses and the Service’s agent signed Form 872-A, which
contained the following language relating to termination of the
agreement:
(1) The amount(s) of any federal income tax due on any
return(s) made by or for the above taxpayer(s) for the
period(s) ended December 31, 1981 may be assessed on or
before the 90th (ninetieth) day after: (a) the Internal
Revenue Service office considering the case receives Form
872-T, Notice of Termination of Special Consent to Extend
the Time to Assess Tax, from the taxpayer(s); or (b) the
Internal Revenue Service mails Form 872-T to the
taxpayer(s); or (c) the Internal Revenue Service mails a
2
See Masraff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-638.
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