- 26 -
States, supra (citing Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426, 431 (1955)), as in other cases, the wrongdoer obtained
"complete dominion" over his illegal gains.
If petitioner could show that he accrued no gain or benefit
and had mere dominion over the funds without control, he could
rebut the presumption that the funds are taxable income to him.
Brittingham v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 91, 101 (1971). Petitioner
posits just that theory: While he admits that the source of
funds was illegal, he maintains that Safra and to a lesser extent
Barnett money market were mere conduits for funds that supported
the various enterprises that Ben caused to be created to launder
the proceeds of his illegal marijuana smuggling. Petitioner
argues that he lacked the requisite dominion and control because
he was not free to use the funds at will. See Ianniello v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165, 173 (1992) (citing Rutkin v. United
States, supra at 137).
Petitioner relies upon his own testimony as his primary
proof. "Undoubtedly, as a general rule, positive testimony as to
a particular fact, uncontradicted by any one, should control the
decision of the court; but that rule admits of many exceptions",
Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 420 (1891); Greenfeld
v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 318, 319-320 (4th Cir. 1947), affg. a
Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated Feb. 26, 1947, and courts
are not obliged to accept testimony of interested parties that is
not credible and is not corroborated by any other evidence.
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