- 38 -
In 1987, the parties stipulated the unexplained bank
deposits were $36,088. They also stipulated items of income and
deductions such that petitioner's taxable income in 1987 upon
which the deficiency is calculated is $30,082.
ii. Fraudulent intent
The Code does not specifically define fraudulent intent.
However, courts have developed a working definition of fraudulent
intent as the "`actual, intentional wrongdoing, and the intent
required is the specific purpose to evade a tax believed to be
owing'". Estate of Temple v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 143, 159
(1976) (quoting Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th
Cir. 1941), revg. 40 B.T.A. 424 (1939)); see also Chin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-54.
Fraudulent intent may never be imputed or assumed, but must
be proven by independent evidence. Recklitis v. Commissioner,
supra at 909-910 (citing Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 92
(1970)); see also Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123
(1983); Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213, 224 (1971). Because
direct proof is often difficult to obtain, respondent may use
circumstantial evidence. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492,
499 (1943); Stephenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 995, 1005-1006
(1982), affd. 748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Powell v.
Granquist, 252 F.2d 56, 61 (9th Cir. 1958); Gajewski v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 181, 200 (1976), affd. without published
opinion 578 F.2d 1383 (8th Cir. 1978).
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