- 25 -
described by Sandra Turpen, are not necessarily representative of
the procedures of any other plan, and may not therefore be relied
upon as the basis for finding facts except as to the Plan for
which Ms. Turpen was the administrator. We find this argument
disingenuous. Petitioner and respondent stipulated Ms. Turpen's
deposition as a joint exhibit in lieu of testimony by Ms. Turpen
at trial, without any reservation as to its use, or inferences to
be drawn from it, whatsoever. Petitioner's purpose in
stipulating the deposition is not apparent, if the testimony is
not stipulated for the purpose of exemplifying the administrative
procedures of all of the CBA Plans involved in this case. If
petitioner considers the administration of Ms. Turpen's plan to
be atypical, petitioner was free to introduce evidence as to how
the other plans were administered, which petitioner chose not to
do. We therefore reject petitioner's complaint about scope of
the testimony.
Petitioner argues that respondent's position is inconsistent
not only with Rev. Rul. 76-28, supra, but also with the
administrative position taken in Technical Advice Memorandum
8210014 (TAM) and in a series of private letter rulings.
Respondent points out that section 6110(j)(3) prohibits using or
citing a written determination as a precedent, unless regulations
Page: Previous 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011