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For purposes of the discussion that follows, it is important
to recognize that the parties to this case disagree as to the
proper standard to apply in determining whether a departure from
the actuarial tables is warranted.1 In particular, respondent
relies on Miami Beach First Natl. Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d
116 (5th Cir. 1971), and Estate of Fabric v. Commissioner, 83
T.C. 932 (1984), for the proposition that it is proper to depart
from the actuarial tables where death is either “imminent or
predictable”. On the other hand, petitioner relies on Rev. Rul.
80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, in support of its position that the
controlling standard is whether death is “clearly imminent”.
Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, 195, states in pertinent
part:
In view of recent case law, the resulting
principle is as follows: the current actuarial tables
in the regulations shall be applied if valuation of an
individual's life interest is required for purposes of
the federal estate or gift taxes unless the individual
is known to have been afflicted, at the time of
transfer, with an incurable physical condition that is
in such an advanced stage that death is clearly
imminent. Death is not clearly imminent if there is a
reasonable possibility of survival for more than a very
1As stated in our earlier Memorandum Opinion:
The crux of the dispute centers on whether Gordon's
death was sufficiently certain as of March 5, 1986, as
to justify a deviation from the actuarial tables. At a
more fundamental level, the parties disagree with
respect to the specific legal standard to apply in
resolving this issue. [Estate of McLendon v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-459, 66 TCM (CCH) at 964,
64 TCM (RIA) at 2456 (slip op. at 57).]
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