- 7 - For purposes of the discussion that follows, it is important to recognize that the parties to this case disagree as to the proper standard to apply in determining whether a departure from the actuarial tables is warranted.1 In particular, respondent relies on Miami Beach First Natl. Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971), and Estate of Fabric v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 932 (1984), for the proposition that it is proper to depart from the actuarial tables where death is either “imminent or predictable”. On the other hand, petitioner relies on Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, in support of its position that the controlling standard is whether death is “clearly imminent”. Rev. Rul. 80-80, 1980-1 C.B. 194, 195, states in pertinent part: In view of recent case law, the resulting principle is as follows: the current actuarial tables in the regulations shall be applied if valuation of an individual's life interest is required for purposes of the federal estate or gift taxes unless the individual is known to have been afflicted, at the time of transfer, with an incurable physical condition that is in such an advanced stage that death is clearly imminent. Death is not clearly imminent if there is a reasonable possibility of survival for more than a very 1As stated in our earlier Memorandum Opinion: The crux of the dispute centers on whether Gordon's death was sufficiently certain as of March 5, 1986, as to justify a deviation from the actuarial tables. At a more fundamental level, the parties disagree with respect to the specific legal standard to apply in resolving this issue. [Estate of McLendon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-459, 66 TCM (CCH) at 964, 64 TCM (RIA) at 2456 (slip op. at 57).]Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Next
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