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sively to his two Crestwood condominium units. Accordingly, we
find that petitioners have failed to establish that petitioner is
to be treated as having materially participated during each of
the years at issue in his rental activity at Crestwood under
section 1.469-5T(a)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg.
5725 (Feb. 25, 1988).
Section 1.469-5T(a)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs.
Petitioners claim that petitioner should be treated as
having materially participated in his rental activity at Crest-
wood for each of the years at issue under section 1.469-5T(a)(6),
Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5726 (Feb. 25, 1988),
because his rental activity at Crestwood was a personal service
activity and he materially participated in that activity for the
three taxable years preceding each of the taxable years at issue.
Respondent disagrees with petitioners' contention.
Section 1.469-5T(d), Temporary Income Tax Regs., supra,
defines the term "personal service activity" as follows:
(d) Personal service activity. An activity con-
stitutes a personal service activity * * * if such
activity involves the performance of personal services
in--
(A) The fields of health, law, engineering,
architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing
arts, or consulting; or
(B) Any other trade or business in which
capital is not a material income-producing factor.
The regulations under section 469 do not provide a definition of
what constitutes an activity in which capital is not a material
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