- 32 -
See Tripp v. Commissioner, 337 F.2d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1964),
affg. T.C. Memo. 1963-244; see also Estate of Fittl v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1986-452. In order for the Court to
value property under a comparable sales methodology, we must
first be satisfied that the qualities of the properties which
provide the market benchmark are substantially similar to the
property for which the value is sought, or that proper
adjustments may be made to account for any differences.
Estate of Palmer v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 420, 424 (8th Cir.
1988), revg. on other grounds 86 T.C. 66 (1986); Wolfsen Land &
Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 19-20. We are not so
satisfied in this case.
We also are troubled by the fact that Tonna's methodology
inappropriately focuses on the views of the buyer, to the
exclusion of the seller. See Mandelbaum v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1995-255 (expert's disregard for the views of a willing
seller may be fatal to the expert's opinion); see also Estate of
Cloutier v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-49. Although a buyer
would most likely want to purchase the subject assets at Tonna's
ascertained values, the test of fair market value rests on the
concept of a hypothetical willing buyer and a hypothetical
willing seller. Ignoring the views of the willing seller is
contrary to this well-established test, and, as mentioned above,
may be fatal. In this regard, our reading of Tonna's report does
not persuade us that he ever considered whether a hypothetical
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