Carlton H. Perry - Page 13

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               Based on the state of the record in this case, we do not               
          place any particular weight on the real estate log in resolving             
          whether petitioner used the motor home in connection with his               
          rental real estate activities.  Even assuming arguendo that we              
          were willing to place any weight on that log, we do not believe             
          that it establishes that the trips taken by petitioner in the               
          motor home during 1989 were primarily for business, rather than             
          personal, purposes, nor does it establish any other business use            
          of the motor home during that year.7                                        
               Based on our review of the entire record in this case, we              
          find that petitioner has failed to establish that the motor home            
          was used in carrying on his rental real estate activities within            
          the meaning of section 162(a) or that it was used in or for those           
          activities within the meaning of section 167(a).8  Consequently,            
          we find that petitioner has failed to establish that he is en-              
          titled for 1989 to the deductions he claimed under sections                 
          162(a) and 167(a) with respect to the motor home.                           
               Even assuming arguendo that the motor home expenses at issue           
          were allowable deductions under sections 162(a) and 167(a), those           


          7  Although petitioner also testified about the real properties             
          that he allegedly visited during the trips in 1989 that he and              
          Ms. Perry took in the motor home, his testimony with respect to             
          that matter was general, vague, and/or conclusory.  As stated               
          above, we are unwilling to rely on petitioner's testimony to                
          sustain his burden of proof in this case.                                   
          8  In fact, petitioner has failed to establish that during the              
          year at issue his rental real estate activities were sufficiently           
          systematic and continuous so as to constitute a trade or busi-              
          ness.  See Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. at 775.                         



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