Michael W. and Charlotte S. Phillips - Page 7

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          ministerial act the same binding effect as a considered judgment            
          would make little sense as a practical matter.                              
               Respondent’s ultimate rejection of petitioners’ amended                
          return for 1985 was entirely proper.  The ability of a taxpayer             
          to amend his return creates administrative problems for a tax               
          system in which determination and assessment of taxes are                   
          predicated on the annual accounting principle.  Pacific Natl. Co.           
          v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194 (1938); Bartlett v. Delaney, 173 F.2d           
          535 (1st Cir. 1949).  Allowing the taxpayer to use the benefit of           
          hindsight to select the most favorable set of intertemporal tax             
          consequences for his transactions would be highly prejudicial to            
          the revenue.  Melahn v. Commissioner, supra at 776-777.                     
          Accordingly, the case law recognizes limits on the effectiveness            
          of amended returns, generally.  Koch v. Alexander, 561 F.2d 1115,           




          (...continued)                                                              
          of 150 days after the FPAA is mailed to the tax matters partner.            
          Sec. 6225.  A “deficiency” for purposes of sec. 6225 means the              
          excess of tax due over the amount shown on the original return              
          plus any additional amount shown as tax on an amended return,               
          “other than amounts of additional tax which such return clearly             
          indicates the taxpayer is protesting rather than admitting.”                
          Sec. 301.6211-1(a), Proced. & Admin. Regs.  Treatment of the                
          investment credits had been a matter of controversy during the              
          audit of Ethanol and was the subject of adjustments in the FPAA.            
          On their amended returns for 1985 and 1986 petitioners explained            
          that their purpose in seeking to revoke the credit was merely to            
          stop the interest charges, not to concede liability.                        
          Consequently, it appears that the assessed amounts should have              
          been treated as part of the deficiency attributable to a                    
          partnership item.  See Powerstein v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 466              
          (1992).  Yet respondent assessed these amounts only 125 days                
          after issuing the FPAA.  If respondent’s assessments with respect           
          to the amended returns exceeded the scope of her authority, the             
          argument that these assessments validated petitioners’ amended              
          returns becomes all the more dubious.                                       



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