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made an unauthorized change in method of accounting when it
changed the definition of such units to body size in its LIFO
inventory computations subsequent to Richardson I. Petitioner
asserts that Investments elected to define its inventory units
for its new car pool by body size, and it consistently applied
the body size definition from the year of election through the
computations subsequent to Richardson I. In the alternative,
petitioner asserts that respondent implicitly consented to a body
size definition of its inventory units.
To determine the scope of a taxpayer’s LIFO election, we
examine the facts and circumstances of the case. First Natl.
Bank v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1069, 1080 (1987). In First Natl.
Bank, we addressed the issue of whether a taxpayer had elected to
include soil aggregate in its LIFO inventory. After analyzing
the scope of the taxpayer’s business, the information provided on
its Form 970, its tax returns, and other business records, we
held that the taxpayer had elected to include the soil aggregate
in its LIFO inventory. Id. at 1079-1080. Petitioner has the
burden of proof on this issue. Rule 142(a).
There is some language in Richardson I which suggests that
Investments defined its inventory units by model code.
Richardson Invs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. at 739. However,
as discussed more fully infra p. 36, this finding was not
material to the decision in that case. Furthermore, Investments'
comptroller and Investments' C.P.A. both testified that
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