- 15 -
declined to apply the rehabilitation doctrine because "the
brewery was in operating condition and use during the taxable
years in question and had been for several years before." Id. at
568. In this case, as was true in Kaonis and Keller,
petitioner's property was generally suitable for its intended
use. Also, the structure of the Rhodes barn was not altered.
However, petitioner must capitalize the $1,500 paid for
installing the two supporting rods in the Rhodes barn.
Petitioner must also capitalize the cost of dividing the stall
into two foaling stalls and demolishing the sheep shed, the cow
stable, and the chicken coop on the Whitefeather property. The
invoice for this work did not itemize these expenses. Therefore,
we will make an allocation based on the information available to
us. We find that of the $4,700 spent by petitioner on the
Whitefeather buildings, $900 must be capitalized and added to
petitioner's basis in the Whitefeather land and $100 must be
capitalized as the cost of creating the two foaling stalls. Sec.
280B.
Petitioner's 1992 Interest Deduction
Petitioner's burden of proving that respondent's
determinations in her deficiency notice are erroneous includes
the burden of substantiation. See Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir.
1976). Deductions are a matter of legislative grace; petitioner
has the burden of showing that she is entitled to any deduction
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011