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violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution because it does not set forth an ascertainable
standard sufficient to alert taxpayers as to the section’s reach.
Petitioner points to the term "significant tax avoidance effect",
and argues that the term is too vague to be interpreted without
regulations.
We disagree with petitioner's claim that section 845(b),
without regulations, is unconstitutionally vague. The
Constitution does not require that the Commissioner prescribe
regulations for section 845(b). See SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 201-203 (1947); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942). In the absence of
regulations, the statutory text may be interpreted in light of
all the pertinent evidence, textual and contextual, of its
meaning. See Commissioner v. Soliman, 506 U.S. 168, 173 (1993);
Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947); Old Colony R. Co. v.
Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932). Although it is true,
as petitioner points out, that the Congress anticipated that
regulations would be issued under section 845(b), see
H. Conf. Rept. 98-861, at 1064-1065 (1984), 1984-3 C.B.
(Vol. 2) 1, 318-319, it is not true, as petitioner would have us
hold, that section 845(b) requires regulations in order to be
effective. We find nothing in the statutory text, or in its
legislative history, that conditions the section's effectiveness
on the issuance of regulations. See Estate of Neumann v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. (1996); H. Enters. Intl., Inc.,
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