-5- occasion, petitioner would accompany Mr. Nelson to a real property closing, and petitioner would produce large cashier's checks, which, on occasion, were quite old. These checks were sometimes from other real property closings, and, in one instance, Mr. Nelson observed a check approximating $59,000. Due to Mr. Nelson's accumulation of petitioner's funds, on April 18, 1985, Mr. Nelson executed a $115,321.16 promissory note in favor of petitioner. The $115,321.16 amount represented the balance due to petitioner at that time. In addition to the amount represented by the promissory note, Mr. Nelson, at various times, held an additional $120,000 to $130,000 of petitioner's money. On April 17, 1986, petitioner caused $211,433.80 to be transferred "by wire" from the cotrustee account with Mr. Nelson to petitioner's sole account. Of the $211,433.80, $3,027 represented interest, which petitioner has conceded should have been reported as income for 1986. Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the unexplained deposits remaining in controversy were not includable in his 1986 income, as determined by respondent. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Bank deposits have been held to be prima facie evidence of income. Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74 (1986); Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651 (1975), affd. 566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977).Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
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