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occasion, petitioner would accompany Mr. Nelson to a real
property closing, and petitioner would produce large cashier's
checks, which, on occasion, were quite old. These checks were
sometimes from other real property closings, and, in one
instance, Mr. Nelson observed a check approximating $59,000. Due
to Mr. Nelson's accumulation of petitioner's funds, on April 18,
1985, Mr. Nelson executed a $115,321.16 promissory note in favor
of petitioner. The $115,321.16 amount represented the balance
due to petitioner at that time. In addition to the amount
represented by the promissory note, Mr. Nelson, at various times,
held an additional $120,000 to $130,000 of petitioner's money.
On April 17, 1986, petitioner caused $211,433.80 to be
transferred "by wire" from the cotrustee account with Mr. Nelson
to petitioner's sole account. Of the $211,433.80, $3,027
represented interest, which petitioner has conceded should have
been reported as income for 1986.
Petitioner bears the burden of showing that the unexplained
deposits remaining in controversy were not includable in his 1986
income, as determined by respondent. Rule 142(a); Welch v.
Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). Bank deposits have been held to
be prima facie evidence of income. Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87
T.C. 74 (1986); Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651
(1975), affd. 566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977).
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