-15-
T.C. 858, 867 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992). Though
not conclusive, bank deposits are prima facie evidence of income.
Price v. United States, 335 F.2d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 1964) (the
bank deposits method assumes that all money deposited in a
taxpayer's bank account during a given period constitutes taxable
income);15 Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986);
Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 656-657 (1975),
affd. 566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977); Jones v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.
601 (1957). Where the taxpayer has failed to maintain adequate
records as to the amount and source of his income, and the
Commissioner has determined that the deposits are income, the
taxpayer has the burden of showing that the determination is
incorrect. Rule 142(a); Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632,
645 (1994); Parks v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of Mason v.
Commissioner, supra. Furthermore, in such cases the Commissioner
is not required to show a likely source of income. Clayton v.
Commissioner, supra; Parks v. Commissioner, supra; Estate of
Mason v. Commissioner, supra.
In challenging respondent's income reconstruction,
petitioner introduced evidence that was intended to corroborate
his claim that the deposits were due to nontaxable sources. This
15 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the
former Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to the close of business on Sept. 30, 1981.
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