Alumax Inc. and Consolidated Subsidiaries - Page 72

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          class voting requirements, the mandatory dividend provision, and            
          the objectionable action provision are "similar" to the restric-            
          tions that are "commonly" imposed on the boards of directors of             
          other Delaware corporations "having analogous investor profiles"            
          in order to protect the interests of minority stockholders of               
          those corporations.  In a number of instances, Mr. Balotti's                
          reports do not disclose sufficient facts and data for us to be              
          satisfied that the boards of other Delaware corporations that do,           
          in fact, have investor profiles analogous to that of Alumax are,            
          in fact, commonly limited by all of the restrictions involved in            
          this case or by restrictions that are, in fact, similar to all of           
          those restrictions.17  See Rule 143(f)(1).                                  


          17  Indeed, to the extent that Mr. Balotti's reports do disclose            
          some facts describing what he concludes are restrictions that are           
          "similar" to the director and stockholder class voting require-             
          ments involved here, we disagree that such restrictions are                 
          similar.  By way of illustration, Mr. Balotti states that the               
          director and stockholder class voting requirements with respect             
          to all of the restricted matters presented here are comparable to           
          voting rights that are given to minority stockholders on events             
          such as a merger, an amendment to the certificate of incorpora-             
          tion, a sale of substantially all the assets of a corporation,              
          and a dissolution of a corporation.  However, minority stockhold-           
          ers have voting rights on all of the matters mentioned by Mr.               
          Balotti because State law gives them such rights.  See 2 Fletcher           
          Cyclopedia of Corporations, secs. 542, 544, 545, 546 (perm. ed.             
          1990 rev.).  None of those matters relates to the management of             
          corporate business and affairs which are entrusted to its board             
          of directors under the applicable State law and on which the vote           
          or approval of the stockholders is not required by that law.  In            
          contrast, most of the restricted matters on which the Alumax                
          directors and stockholders, respectively, were required to vote             
          by class were the types of matters relating to the management of            
          the business and affairs of Alumax that were entrusted under                
                                                             (continued...)           





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