Alumax Inc. and Consolidated Subsidiaries - Page 73

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               In any event, even assuming arguendo that Mr. Balotti were             
          correct in his view that all of the restrictions involved in this           
          case, or similar restrictions, are common in Delaware corpora-              
          tions with investor profiles analogous to that of Alumax, in the            
          instant case, we nonetheless would determine the impact, if any,            
          of the director and stockholder class voting requirements, the              
          mandatory dividend provision, and the objectionable action                  
          provision on the voting power of the Alumax class C common stock            
          for purposes of section 1504(a)(1) and amended section                      
          1504(a)(1)(B) and (2)(A), just as we would consider the impact,             
          if any, of such facts on the voting power of the stock of any               


          17  (...continued)                                                          
          Delaware law to the Alumax board except as provided in the 1984             
          restated certificate of incorporation and were matters on which             
          under Delaware law and that certificate the Alumax board was to             
          vote and on which the vote or approval of the Alumax stockholders           
          was not required by Delaware law, although it was required by               
          that certificate.  By way of further illustration, Mr. Balotti              
          concludes that the mandatory dividend provision, which he de-               
          scribes as giving the Mitsui group "80 percent of the first 35%             
          of income distributed by dividends", is comparable to provisions            
          that grant superior dividend rights to preferred stockholders.              
          We disagree.  Although the parties agree that the mandatory                 
          dividend provision gave the Alumax class B common stock superior            
          dividend rights with respect to 35 percent of Alumax' net income,           
          that provision also required the Alumax board to declare and pay            
          dividends to all the Alumax stockholders to the extent of 35                
          percent of Alumax' net income.  In contrast, the preferential               
          dividend provisions to which Mr. Balotti compares the mandatory             
          dividend provision usually do not obligate a company's board of             
          directors to declare and pay dividends, see 12 Fletcher                     
          Cyclopedia of Corporations, secs. 5443-5446 (perm. ed. 1996                 
          rev.), although once the board decides to declare dividends,                
          preferred stockholders with preferential dividend rights have               
          superior rights to such dividends.                                          





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