ASAT, Inc. - Page 43

                                       - 43 -                                         
          the meaning of section 162, an expense need be "appropriate and             
          helpful" to the taxpayer's business.  Welch v. Helvering, 290               
          U.S. 111, 113 (1933).  The requirement that an expense be                   
          "ordinary" connotes that "the transaction which gives rise to it            
          must be of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business            
          involved."  Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940) (citing              
          Welch v. Helvering, supra at 114).                                          
               We question whether the consulting fees were determined on             
          an arm's-length basis.  Mr. Li and Mr. Chapple were friends.                
          Worltek, a corporation owned 50 percent by Mr. Chapple,                     
          eventually acquired 95 percent of petitioner.  QPL, a corporation           
          whose majority shareholder was Mr. Li, later acquired Worltek.              
          There is no evidence in the record of how the consulting fees               
          were determined.  The monthly amounts, which were usually billed            
          on the 10th of each month, were for the half-time services of Mr.           
          Combs and the services of Mr. Smith.  The monthly fees ranged               
          from $31,000 (for just Mr. Smith) to $124,932 (69,632 + 55,300).            
          These relatively large amounts--given the size of petitioner's              
          business--were promptly paid, even though there was no written              
          contract between petitioner and Worltek and the invoices                    
          themselves provided almost no detail.  There is no evidence in              
          the record of the skills Mr. Combs and Mr. Smith may have                   
          possessed to warrant such consulting fees.  We hold that                    
          petitioner has failed to prove that the consulting fees were                
          ordinary and necessary business expenses.                                   




Page:  Previous  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011