- 17 -
supplemented 104 T.C. 417 (1995); Hofstetter v. Commissioner,
supra at 700-701 (1992), and cases cited thereat. It is
sufficient to note that estoppel of the Government is applied
with great restraint, Hofstetter v. Commissioner, supra, and that
petitioner has failed to show that it has met any of these
conditions. In this connection, we note that, as our findings of
fact show, decedent was aware at an early date of the at-risk
problem, i.e., before the expiration date of the POM, October 31,
1984, at the latest, and that he was presumably aware by way of
notice from respondent and from the tax matters partner of the
proceeding in Hambrose I where a petition was filed in 1988.
Sec. 6223(a), (g). We fail to see how petitioner can claim
surprise, hardship, or prejudice sufficient to cause us to
sustain a defense which would require us to hold that petitioner
should totally prevail herein. See and compare Vermouth v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1488 (1987).
It is clear that respondent complied with the statute and
that the notices were timely under section 6229(a) because (1)
there was an FPAA issued to the partnership, (2) a proceeding was
instituted in this Court based on that FPAA, (3) that proceeding
was decided on May 27, 1994, and became final on August 25,1994,8
8 A stipulated decision, though generally not subject to
appeal except on jurisdictional grounds, Clapp v. Commissioner,
875 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1989), is still considered a reviewable
decision which becomes final 90 days after entry of decision.
Pesko v. United States, 918 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Sherry
(continued...)
Page: Previous 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011