- 20 -
single factor, id. at 127, but to whether the combination of
factors and characteristics of the transaction rises to the level
of an "other similar arrangement" with the effect of protecting
decedent against risk.
Respondent first stresses the nonrecourse nature of the
indebtedness involved in the transaction. In Hambrose Leasing v.
Commissioner, 99 T.C. at 301, 303, 312, we decided that, for
purposes of any subsequent litigation involving this partnership,
the partnership's indebtedness involved in the purchase of both
the initial and additional equipment was nonrecourse.9 Where
decedent is personally liable for his share of partnership debt
by virtue of his assumption of the nonrecourse liability, the
presence of that same nonrecourse liability cannot also be said
to be a factor insulating him from risk. See Hayes v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-151; Wag-A-Bag Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-581, and cases cited therein.
9 Petitioner insists we must not carry over the findings
from one case into another. However, any affected items
proceeding will necessarily involve determinations made at the
partnership level. Sec. 6231(a)(5); see Brookes v. Commissioner,
108 T.C. 1 (1997); Kafka & Cavanagh, 1 Litigation of Federal
Civil Tax Controversies par. 9.04[1], at p. 9-5 (2d ed. 1997).
To that extent, petitioner's argument that it ought not be bound
by our findings in a "separate" proceeding is without merit.
Petitioner also presents argument as to why res judicata by
Hayes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-151 (a case dealing with a
similar partnership organized by Hambrose and Charterhouse)
should not apply in this case. Respondent has not asserted res
judicata, and we do not apply it.
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