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residence. Although it is true that petitioner ostensibly made
monthly "rent" payments to Ideal Management, Ideal Management
applied these payments mainly to the residence's mortgage,
property taxes, and other expenses. Thus, we see clearly that
petitioner stood in exactly the same spot with respect to his
assets before and after their transfer to Ideal Management. We
find that the first factor points to a sham.
We find likewise with respect to the second factor; i.e.,
Ideal Management lacked a bona fide independent trustee.
Contrary to the assertions of petitioner and R. Richard Evans,
the named trustee of Ideal Management during 1992, Mr. Evans
could not prevent petitioner from using Ideal Management's
property for his own purposes.4 Petitioner had signature
authority over the Ideal Management account, which meant that he
had access to the funds contained therein. Petitioner also could
not be removed from his position as Ideal Management's manager
without 30 days' notice, which, in turn, gave petitioner
perpetual control of Ideal Management. See United States v.
Scott, supra at 1571. Petitioner's use of the residence and the
tools of his trade also were free from restraint.
As to the third factor, we find no probative evidence in the
record to indicate that petitioner transferred an economic
interest to a third party when he transferred his assets to Ideal
4 Mr. Evans testified on behalf of petitioner. We give his
testimony little weight. Among other things, we note that Mr.
Evans was vague and evasive during his testimony.
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