S. Byrne Doyle and Barbara S. Doyle - Page 11

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          deficiency were issued more than 3 years from the date of the               
          original return.   Thus, respondent's action would be time-                 
          barred, absent some exception to the general rule.                          
               An exception is embodied in section 6229(b)(1)(B) which                
          provides that the 3-year period may be extended:                            
               with respect to all partners, by an agreement entered                  
               into by the Secretary and the tax matters partner (or                  
               any other person authorized by the partnership in                      
               writing to enter into such an agreement), before the                   
               expiration of such period. [Emphasis added.]                           
          The parties agree that there was no TMP for 1983 and, thus, a               
          consent could only have been executed by the "person authorized             
          by the partnership in writing".                                             
               Petitioners contend that the 1986 consent signed by the                
          general partner Mr. Farley was ineffective to extend the 3-year             
          period, because Mr. Farley was not "authorized by the partnership           
          in writing" to execute such a consent.  Therefore, according to             
          petitioners, the 1988 FPAA was untimely, and the subsequent 1996            
          notice of deficiency was consequently also untimely.  Respondent            
          contends that both the 1988 FPAA and the 1996 notice were timely.           
          According to respondent, Mr. Farley was "authorized by the                  
          partnership in writing" to consent to extend the period in which            
          respondent could issue an FPAA, either by the authority granted             
          to him in the partnership agreement, or by State partnership law            
          alone.  Respondent further contends that, even if Mr. Farley was            








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