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not so authorized, petitioners should be equitably estopped from
denying that Mr. Farley executed a valid consent.
Petitioners concede that, if the 1986 consent was validly
executed, then the period of assessment was open under section
6229(b) when the FPAA was issued, the February 6, 1996, notice of
deficiency was timely, and, in light of the decision in Brown v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-379 (in which petitioners were
parties), the substantive determinations set forth therein are
correct. Therefore, the only issue for decision is whether the
1986 consent executed by Mr. Farley was valid by virtue of Mr.
Farley's having been authorized in writing by the partnership
under section 6229(b)(1)(B) to extend the period of limitations.5
There are two potential sources of the authority6 of Mr.
Farley: (1) The partnership agreement itself, and (2)
Pennsylvania partnership law.
5 In this context, petitioners' arguments as to Mr.
Farley's eligibility for TMP status are irrelevant. If he was
authorized in writing, he need not even be a partner, let alone
the TMP. Amesbury Apartments, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 227
(1990).
6 We need not concern ourselves with the regulations
governing agreements to extend the 3-year period of limitations
contained in sec. 301.6229(b)-1, Proposed Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
51 Fed. Reg. 13231, 13243 (April 18, 1986), and sec. 301.6229(b)-
1T, Temporary Proced. & Admin. Regs., 52 Fed. Reg. 6779, 6789
(March 5, 1987). The temporary regulations, which were adopted
after the date upon which Mr. Farley signed the 1986 consent, do
not, however, invalidate prior authorization granted by the
partnership. Amesbury Apartments, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.
227, 242 (1990).
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