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distinguish the case at bar from Gray v. United States, supra,
fall short.
In each of the above cases, the presence of exceptional
circumstances, such as fraud or overreaching, gave the court
grounds to set aside the agreements. See Adkins v. Adkins, supra
at 822 (sufficient showing of extrinsic fraud for the court to
set aside a marital settlement agreement where the husband,
unable to read or write, signed the agreement based on his wife's
misleading representations); Brennan v. Brennan, supra at 525
(sufficient showing of extrinsic fraud for the court to set aside
a marriage settlement agreement where the wife, unrepresented by
counsel, relied to her detriment on the advice of her husband and
his attorney); Moore v. Moore, supra at 624 (wife's waiver of her
interest in the community property set aside where she was not
represented by counsel and spoke only limited English). More-
over, in each of these cases, the court set aside a property
settlement agreement after a divorce decree had been previously
entered. None of the cases involves a court's power to modify an
agreement prior to entering the decree.
Petitioner makes the assertion that the property settlement
agreement in Gray v. United States, supra, was based on the pre-
1967 California law, which is not applicable to decedent.
Specifically, petitioner claims that the agreement in Gray was a
"pre-1967 Integrated Property Settlement Agreement" that was not
incorporated into the divorce decree. However, petitioner has
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