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The rationale of both the Harris and Converse
decisions rests basically on the divorce court's power,
if not duty, to settle property rights as between the
parties, either by adopting their own agreement as in
the Harris case, or by having the matter litigated as
in the Converse case. We do not find this rationale
applicable to a decree ordering payments to adult
offspring of the parties or to minors beyond their
needs for support--the only payments with which we are
now concerned, since that part of the taxpayer's
undertakings necessary for the support of his children
during their minority is concededly not taxable.
[Citations omitted]. While neither the Nevada statute,
Nev. Comp. Laws secs. 9462, 9463 (Supp. 1931-1941),
[Fn. ref. omitted.] nor interpretive decisions indicate
the precise limits of the divorce court's authority in
this area, courts of other jurisdictions operating
under similar statutes have been restricted in their
power to make awards of property to children to amounts
appropriate merely for the maintenance of minor
children. [Citations omitted.] * * *. But since such
a decree provision depends for its validity wholly upon
the consent of the party to be charged with the
obligation and thus cannot be the product of litigation
in the divorce court, we do not consider the rationale
of the Harris decision applicable to the present case.
We therefore conclude that the arrangements here made
for the taxpayer's daughters beyond their support
during minority do not obtain exemption from the
federal gift tax by simply receiving the court's
imprimatur. * * *
Rosenthal v. Commissioner, supra at 508. Like the taxpayer in
Rosenthal, petitioner has not demonstrated that the California
divorce court had the power to modify the provisions of the
property settlement agreements that dealt with the agreed-upon
transfers to the Edwards children. Further, significant policy
concerns are raised by expanding the rule in Harris v. Commis-
sioner, supra, to cover transfers made to a spouse's children.
As we have noted: "To construe the statute as suggested by
petitioner would open a means for a divorcing parent to transfer
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