Leo and Alla Goldberg - Page 28

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          that the determination of whether a property is used by a                   
          taxpayer as his principal residence "depends upon all the facts             
          and circumstances in each case, including the good faith of the             
          taxpayer."  Generally, for property to be "used by the taxpayer             
          as his principal residence" within the meaning of section                   
          1034(a), that taxpayer must physically occupy and live in the               
          dwelling.  Houlette v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 350, 354 (1967);               
          Stolk v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 345, 353-356 (1963), affd. 326               
          F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1964).  See generally Perry v. Commissioner, 91           
          F.3d 82 (9th Cir. 1996), affg. T.C. Memo. 1994-247, for a recent            
          summary of applicable rules.                                                
               For 1988, we have specifically found that petitioners did              
          not occupy 14 Siros as their principal place of residence.  We              
          also found that, when he prepared and filed petitioners' return             
          for 1988, petitioner was familiar with the requirements for                 
          deferral of gain under section 1034 and knew that petitioners did           
          not qualify for deferral with respect to the gain on the property           
          at 14 Siros, but nonetheless claimed the deferral on the return             
          in order to defeat or avoid the taxes known to be owing on the              
          gain that they realized from sale of that property.  In addition,           
          petitioners reported sale of their actual residence, Apricot, as            
          a sale of business property, thereby concealing the identity of             
          their actual residence.  We reject the testimony by both                    
          petitioners at trial that they actually resided at 14 Siros and             
          that they received rental income from a tenant at Apricot.                  




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