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Nor can a life tenant convey any greater title than he or she may
own. Mason v. Carter, 153 S.E.2d 162, 164 (Ga. 1967); Rigdon v.
Cooper, 47 S.E.2d 633, 637 (Ga. 1948). Thus, it is clear that
although decedent intended each year to transfer fractional fee
simple interests in the Weinstock Residence, she could have
conveyed no more than interests in her life estate.
The fact that decedent actually owned a lesser estate in the
property than what she thought she was devised, and intended to
transfer, does not invalidate the transfers. McDaniel v. Bagby,
51 S.E.2d 805, 809 (Ga. 1949) (should the holder of a life estate
undertake to convey the entire estate in lands, he would simply
convey his estate for life). Each year, decedent intended to
give one-ninth of the entirety of her interest in the Weinstock
Residence to each of her three children, and the children agreed
to accept that amount. Decedent's transfers of fractional
interests in a lesser estate than a fee simple absolute is not
inconsistent with this intent.
Furthermore, the fact that the deed recorded in 1984 recited
a greater estate in the property than what decedent actually
owned does not void the transfer. A deed which conveys any
estate in realty, if valid as to the estate conveyed, cannot be
canceled in its entirety because the deed may be invalid as to
some other estate sought to be conveyed therein. McDaniel v.
Bagby, supra at 810; see also, McLemore v. Wilborn, 383 S.E.2d
892 (Ga. 1989) (delivery of otherwise valid deed is sufficient to
sustain inter vivos gift of real estate); Rogers v. Pitchford,
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