Gerald Jacoby and Arlene Jacoby - Page 3

                  All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in                          
            effect for the years in issue, unless otherwise indicated, and                            
            all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and                            
            Procedure.  References to section 7430 are to that section as                             
            amended by section 1551 of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.                            
            99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2752 (effective for proceedings commenced                         
            after Dec. 31, 1985).  Section 7430 was amended most recently by                          
            the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. 104-168, secs. 701-704,                            
            110 Stat. 1452, 1463-1464 (1996), applicable to proceedings                               
            commenced after July 30, 1996.  The parties do not dispute that                           
            this proceeding was commenced before July 30, 1996.                                       
                  We decide petitioner's motion on the basis of the motion,                           
            memoranda of law, and affidavits submitted by the parties.                                
            Neither party requested a hearing, and we conclude that a hearing                         
            is not necessary.  Rule 232(a)(3).                                                        
                  We first address whether petitioner exhausted the                                   
            administrative remedies available to her within the Internal                              
            Revenue Service (IRS) as required by section 7430(b)(1).                                  
            Respondent contends that petitioner failed to exhaust her                                 
            administrative remedies because she never requested an Appeals                            
            conference after respondent issued a 30-day letter on October 6,                          
            1984.  Petitioner does not dispute that respondent issued a 30-                           
            day letter.  Petitioner makes no argument that the 30-day letter                          
            was never received either by her, Gerald, or their                                        







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