- 14 -
v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 143, 159 (1976). The existence of fraud
is a factual question. Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1,
19 (1980).
Fraudulent intent may never be imputed or assumed, but must
be proven by independent evidence. Recklitis v. Commissioner,
supra at 909-910 (citing Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 92
(1970)); see also Rowlee v. Commissioner, supra at 1123; Stone v.
Commissioner, supra at 224. We do not sustain the Commissioner's
determination of fraud when we are left with only a suspicion of
fraud, Green v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 538, 550 (1976); see also
Comparato v. Commissioner, supra, and even a strong suspicion
does not suffice, Drieborg v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 216,
219-220 (6th Cir. 1955), affg. in part and revg. and remanding in
part a Memorandum Opinion of this Court; Axelrod v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1982-92, affd. without published opinion 711 F.2d 1062
(9th Cir. 1983).
Because direct proof is often difficult to obtain,
respondent may use circumstantial evidence to prove a taxpayer's
fraud. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943);
Stephenson v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 995, 1005-1006 (1982), affd.
748 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Powell v. Granquist, 252
F.2d 56, 61 (9th Cir. 1958); Gajewski v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.
181, 200 (1976), affd. without published opinion 578 F.2d 1383
(8th Cir. 1978). We examine the taxpayer's entire course of
conduct to determine whether respondent has met her burden of
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