Kirk A. Keegan, Jr. - Page 7

                                                - 7 -                                                 
            amount of all payments from April 1, 1992, to May 6, 1992                                 
            ($17,934), since, he argues, a written separation agreement                               
            existed on April 1, 1992, within the meaning of section                                   
            71(b)(2)(B), in the form of the March 30, 1992, letter.                                   
            Respondent contends, on the other hand, that there was no written                         
            agreement prior to the entry of the Stipulation and Order to Show                         
            Cause.  On that basis, respondent maintains that no alimony                               
            deduction for the period prior to May 6, 1992, is allowable.                              
                  We have no doubt that the payments at issue were intended to                        
            be in the nature of alimony; nevertheless, for reasons which                              
            follow, we agree with respondent that the facts of this case show                         
            that there was no written separation agreement within the ambit                           
            of section 71(b)(2)(B) prior to May 6, 1992.                                              
                  The term "written separation agreement" is not defined by                           
            the Code, the legislative history, or applicable regulations.                             
            Bogard v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 97, 100 (1972); Ewell v.                                  
            Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-253.  However, we have stated                               
            previously that a written separation agreement is a clear,                                
            written statement of the terms of support for separated parties.                          
            Bogard v. Commissioner, supra at 101.  It must be a writing that                          
            constitutes an agreement.  Grant v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 809,                            
            823 (1985), affd. without published opinion 800 F.2d 260 (4th                             
            Cir. 1986).  An agreement requires mutual assent or a meeting of                          

Page:  Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011