- 11 -
her signature was not on the March 30, 1992, letter, nor was
there any other writing executed on her behalf evidencing an
agreement. Moreover, it is well settled that the subsequent
acceptance of support payments by a spouse, without more, does
not transform a unilateral offer into a bilateral agreement. See
Harlow v. Commissioner, supra; Nemeth v. Commissioner, supra;
Greenfield v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1978-386.
We conclude that, taken together, the March 30, 1992, letter
and the fact that petitioner provided support for Mrs. Keegan
prior to May 6, 1992, do not rise to the level of a written
separation agreement for purposes of sections 71(b)(2) and 215.
See Grant v. Commissioner, supra at 822-823; cf. Ewell v.
Commissioner, supra. Therefore, we hold that none of the
payments that petitioner made before the Stipulation and Order to
Show Cause was filed on May 6, 1992, may be deducted by
petitioner as alimony under section 215.
To reflect the foregoing,
An appropriate order
will be issued, and a decision
will be entered under
Rule 155.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Last modified: May 25, 2011